

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 CAIRO 11485

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OREP (JAVITS, JACOB)
SUBJ: CODEL JAVITS - MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SADAT

SUMMARY: CODEL JAVITS MET WITH PRESIDENT SADAT IN ALEXAN-
DRIA JULY 10, 1977. SENATOR JAVITS EXPLAINED ISRAELI
SECURITY FEARS AND NEED TO CAREFULLY STRUCTURE FUTURE
OF WEST BANK IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE SECURITY. HE SURFACED
IDEA OF " PRELIMINARY MEETING" PRIOR TO GENEVA WHICH WOULD
TRY TO IRON OUT SOME OF THE MORE DIFFICULT POINTS. SADAT
REJECTED THIS IDEA ALTHOUGH HE SEEMED HAVE NO TROUBLE
WITH ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING GROUP, AT APPROPRIATE
LEVEL, UNDER U.S. AUSPICES TO PREPARE (UNSPECIFIED) FOR
GENEVA. SADAT EXPLAINED THAT TIME IS RIGHT FOR PEACE
BUT HE FEARFUL ISRAELIS MAY NOT BE READY. HE SAID ENTIRE
ARAB WORLD, WITH EXCEPTION OF LIBYANS AND SOUTH YEMENIS
WOULD NOW ACCEPT A PEACE AGREEMENT (EVEN IRAQIS HAVE ASSURED
HIM THEY WILL NOT OPPOSE AND PALESTINIANS CAN BE BROUGHT
ALONG). SADAT AGREED WITH SENATOR THAT THERE MUST BE SOME
FORM OF LINK BETWEEN JORDAN AND POSSIBLE WEST BANK PAL-
ESTINIAN STATE. SADAT SAID HE BELIEVES ONLY U.S. CAN NOW
PROPOSE SOLUTION WHICH CAN BE NEGOTIATED BY BOTH SIDES
AND HE LIKENED THIS TO ROLE WHICH U.S. HAD PLAYED AT TIME
OF FIRST SINAI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. ON NORMALIZATION
HE DID NOT PRECLUDE STEPS SUCH AS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
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(ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT BE FIVE YEARS AFTER AGREEMENT) SAYING
THAT ONLY EGYPT HAS CAPABILITY TO TAKE LEADS IN SUCH
DECISIONS. END SUMMARY

1. SENATOR JAVITS AND PRESIDENT SADAT HAD EIGHTY MINUTE
MEETING FOLLOWED BY LUNCHEON AT PRESIDENT'S HOUSE IN
ALEXANDRIA JULY 10, 1977. AMBASSADOR, LAKELAND AND AMB-

ASSADOR GHORBAL WERE ALSO PRESENT. SENATOR EXPRESSED HIS REGRET AT NOT HAVING BEEN ABLE TO ARRANGE VISIT TO DAMSCUS TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT ASAD, BUT SAID HE WOULD BE TRYING TO DO SO IN NEAR FUTURE. HIS VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA HAD IMPRESSED HIM WITH DEPTH OF COMPETENCE IN SAUDI GOVERNMENT. HE FOUND THEM READY FOR PEACE AND WAS ENCOURAGED BY THEIR BELIEF THAT ONCE PEACE IS ACHIEVED, THERE WILL BE REAL COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA. SAUDIS ALSO IMPRESSED HIM BY THEIR LACK OF FANATICISM ON JERUSALEM. HE FELT THAT IMPLICIT IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM WAS ACCEPTANCE OF FACT THAT THEIR MAIN CONCERN WOULD BE ACCESS TO RELIGIOUS FACILITIES. SENATOR OPINED THIS WOULD BE MORE THAN FULFILLED IN ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT. NEITHER KING KHALID NOR PRINCE FAHD HAD MENTIONED JERUSALEM IN THEIR MEETING WITH HIM; PRINCE SAUD HAD DISCUSSED IT, BUT THERE WAS NO CONCENTRATION ON THE ISSUE. SENATOR FELT THIS WAS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.

2. SENATOR NOTED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD JUST DEPARTED ALEXANDRIA. DURING CODEL'S MEETING WITH HIM IN AMMAN HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY KING'S WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY RABAT DECISION ON PLO LEADERSHIP OF PALESTINIANS. NEVERTHELESS SENATOR FELT THAT SOME WAY HAD TO BE FOUND FOR HUSSEIN TO REGAIN HIS PALESTINIAN CONSTITUENCY. KING HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN A PLEBISCITE ON THE WEST BANK AS A WAY OF BEGINNING THIS PROCESS. SENATOR SAID THERE MUST BE LINK

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BETWEEN ANY WEST BANK PALESTINIAN STATE AND JORDAN AND THIS SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED BEFORE GENEVA CONFERENCE. PRESIDENT SADAT AGREED AND RECALLED HE HAD SAID THIS PUBLICLY SEVERAL TIMES.

3. ON BEGIN, SENATOR TOLD PRESIDENT THAT HE COULD NOT RPT NOT REPORT THAT ISRAEL'S NEW PRIME MINISTER HAS REDUCED HIS ASSERTIONS REGARDING WEST BANK. SENATOR BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS SO MUCH GIVE AND TAKE GOING ON THAT HE WILL NOT BE AS INFLEXIBLE AS HE SOUNDS NOW. HE NOTED THERE IS ABSOLTE AGREEMENT ON ALL SIDES THAT NOW IS TIME FOR PEACE SETTLEMENT. WHEN HE (BEGIN) GETS DOWN TO MAKING THE CRUCIAL DECISIONS, HE WILL WANT MANY THINGS AND THERE ARE EQUALLY AS MANY THING HE WILLHAVE TO GIVE. SENATOR OBSERVED THAT ISRAELI POSITION ON WEST BANK IS TOTALLY UNDERSTANDABLE IN LIGHT OF CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE 1967. CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON, SURPRISE ATTACK IN 1973, HAVE CHANGED IDEA OF WHAT ISRAELIS NEED FOR THEIR BASIC SECURITY. THEY BELIEVE THAT INDEPENDENT WEST BANK PALESTINIAN STAE WOULD BE CONSTANT THREAT. WHATEVER FORMULA DEVELOPS FOR WEST BANK IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTEDIN STAGES INCLUDING PHASE OUT OF ISRAELI PRESENCE, UNTIL IT BECOMES

CLEAR HOW NORMALIZATION PROCESS IS WORKING. SENATOR SAID THAT ISRAELIS ARE NOT GOING TO DEPEND MUCH ON GUARANTEES ("THEY WILL BE A FACTOR"); THEY WILL BE PART OF THE MIX OF SETTLEMENT, BUT IT WILL NOT BE A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THAT SETTLEMENT.

4. IN PURSUIT OF PEACE AGREEMENT, SENATOR SAID HE BELIEVES ON ROAD TO GENEVA IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CONVENE SOME SORT OF PRELIMINARY MEETING. SUCH MEETING WOULD CONSIDER MODALITIES, SOUND OUT BOTH SIDES SO THAT EVERYONE CAN GO TO GENEVA WITH GREATER POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS. SECRETARY VANCE WILL BE MORE ABLE TO DEVELOP THIS CONCEPT ONCE BEGIN VISIT IS OVER. SUCH MEETING COULD MOST USEFULLY TAKE PLACE IN WASHINGTON. IN MEANTIME, SENATOR SAID THAT
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HE WAS PLEASED AT HALT CALLED IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON ME BECAUSE THIS WOULD PAVE WAY FOR SUCCESSFUL BEGIN VISIT. HE SAID HE HAD URGED BEGIN TO FORGET ABOUT REITERATION OF HIS POSITIONS AND GO TO WASHINGTON READY TO GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS, WHAT DOES HE WANT AND WHEN DOES HE WANT IT.

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5. TURNING TO QUESTION OF NORMALIZATION, SEN SAID THAT FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH SPEAKER MAR'I PREVIOUS SEVENING HE HAD DEVELOPED POSSIBLE TWO STEP NORMALIZATION SCENARIO. FIRST WOULD BE JURIDICAL NORMALIZATION, WHEN LAWS WOULD BE

CHANGED WHICH WOULD PERMIT TOURISM, TRAVEL, BUSINESS, EXCHANGE AND TRADE. ONCE PHYSICAL BARRIERS ARE KNOCKED DOWN, THEN NORMALIZATION WOULD PROCEED NATURALLY. SEN DESCRIBED THIS APPROACH AS REVERSE STEP BY STEP. FIRST FRAMEWORK WOULD BE DEVELOPED WITH VARIOUS STEPS TO REALIZE THAT FRAMEWORK BEING DESCRIBED. SEN LIKENED THIS APPROACH TO THE "BARUCH PLAN" FOR US"SOVIET REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS JUST AFTER SECOND WORLD WAR. EACH SIDE TAKES MODERATE STEPS IN SEQUENCE WHILE DEVELOPING TRUST OF THE OTHER.

6. FOLLOWING SEN'S STATEMENTS, PRES SADAT BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THAT IF ISRAEL REALLY WANTS PEACE THEN IT CAN BE NEGOTIATED IN "ONE MONTH". HIS FEAR IS, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT PEACE. HE PLACED EMPHASIS ON ASSURANCES THAT PEACE CAN BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES WITH US HELP. SPEAKING TO SEN'S PROPOSAL FOR PRELIMINARY MEETING, PRES SAID THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN MARCH HE HAD URGED ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUP FOR GENEVA CONF SO THAT ADEQUATE PREPARATION COULD BEGIN. HE OBSERVED THAT IF PARTIES ARE NOT PREPARED, THEY SHOULD NOT CONVENE CONFERENCE. HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT SEN'S IDEA OF A PRELIMINARY

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MEETING. WE HAVE EXPERIENCED SUCH PROPOSALS BEFORE, HE SAID, AND THERE IS SO MUCH SUSPICION ON BOTH SIDES THAT IT WOULD BE STALEMATED. PRES REITERATED THAT MOST CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN SUCCESS OF CONFERENCE IS UNITED STATES. US HAD NEVER REVEALED ITS POSITION ON SHAPE OF SETTLEMENT; THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. SADAT AID HE UNDERSTOOD US CANNOT FORCE ISRAELIS BUT FACT REMAINS THAT IT IS ONLY THE UNITED STATES WHO WILL BE ABLE TO BRING TWO SIDES TOGETHER. AS ANALOGY SADAT RECALLED DEADLOCK IN FIRST SINAI DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS WHEN IT LOOKED AS IF THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT. AT THAT POINT HE HAD APPEALED TO THEN SEC KISSINGER TO MAKE PROPOSAL, WHICH KISSINGER DID. THAT WAS KEY TO SUCCESS OF FIRST DISENGAGEMENT TALKS. SADAT SAID THAT HE TRUSTS US; NOW IS THE TIME TO REACH PEACE THROUGH US INITIATIVE.

7. SADAT THEN DESCRIBED HIS RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS FOLLOWING RECENT VISIT OF FORNMIN FAHMY TO MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT BREZHNEV HAD SENT HIM TO THREATS. THE FIRST DEALT WITH ME PEACE. STILL SMARTING FROM THEIR EXCLUSION FROM PEACE PROCESS FOLLOWING OCT 73 WAR, BREZHNEV HAD WARNED THAT IF USSR IS EXCLUDED FROM PEACE SETTLEMENT THAN SOVIETS WILL OPPOSE IT AND IT WILL NOT WORK. SADAT SAID HE SHOULD HAVE STRUCK AT SOVIETS, BUT HE HAD IGNORED IT. RECENT STATEMENTS BY CARTER HAD SHOWN US GOOD WILL; IF ISRAEL REALLY WANTS PEACE, SADAT REITERATED, IT CAN NOW BE OBTAINED. ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT TRY TO MAKE OCCUPATION A "PLEDGE", THEN WE CAN

DISCUSS PEACE I BROADEST MANING; I.E., ENDING BELLIGERENCY,
ESTABLISHING GUARANTEES OF WHAT EVER KIND NECESSARY. WORK-
ING WITH THE US AFTER OCT 73 WAR, SADAT SAID, HE HAD
CHANGED WHOLE MENTALITY OF ME TOWARDS ISRAEL. BREZHNEV'S
THREAT IS EVIDENCE OF SUCCESS OF THIS COOPERATION. SADAT
EMPHASIZED HE WOULD NOT BLOCK WHATEVER SPECIAL RELATION-
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SHIPS ARE NECESSARY, REMINDING ONLY THAT, AT SAME TIME ISRAEL'S
SECURITY IS GUARANTEED, EGYTP'S MUST ALSO BE SECURED.

8. SADAT AGREED THAT CONTENT OF PEACE IS BEGINNING TO BE
PROBLEM. ISRAELIS WANT FULL DIP RELATIONS, ETC. PERHAPS IT
IS NOT POSSIBLE, BUT IF IT IS, EGYPT IS ONLY COUNTRY
WHICH CAN BRING IT ABOUT. SADAT SAID THAT PERHAPS FIVE
YEARS AFTER PEACE, ITMIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE DIPLOMATIC
EXCHANGES. THIS SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED NOW, HOWEVER, WE
SHOULD DISCUSS WITH YOU (US) PEACE BECAUSE ONLY YOU
CAN FULFILL IT. ANY QUESTION ISRAL RAISES, EXCEPT CONTINUED
OCCUPATION OF MY LAND, I AM READY TO DISCUSS, SADAT SAID.

9. RETURNING TO SECOND THREAT FROM BREZHNEV , SADAT AID
THIS WAS A PLEDGE OF SUPPORT FOR ETHIOPIA. BREZHNEV SAID
THEY WOULD DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO SUPPORT ETHIOPIA,
AND THEY (SOVIETS) SHALL CONTINUE THEIR "ACTIVIES"
THROUGHOUT AFRICA. SADAT SAID HE TOLD BREZHNEV THAT HE (SADAT)
WOULD NEVER ATTACK ETHIOPIA AND SOVIETS HAD ASSURED HIM
ETHIOPIA WOULD NOT ATTACK EGYPT. ARMS TO ETHIOPIA ARE ROUTED
THROUGH LIBYA.

10. URGENT PROBLEM NOW, HOWEVER, IS IN CHAD. SADAT HAD DIS-
PATCHED VP MUBARAK AT MIDNIGHT JULY 8 TO EXPLAIN TO PRES
NUMEIRI URGENCY OF SITUATION. CHAD WANTS SUDAN TO OCCUPY
ITS (CHAD'S) EASTERN PROVINCES TO FREE TROOPS FOR FIGHT-
ING AGAINST LIBYAN INVADERS FROM NORTH. NUMEIRI HAS PROVEN
RELUCTANT TO TO DO SO BECAUSE HE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND SIT-
UATION. SADAT SAID FACT THAT ARMS ARE BEING POURED INTO
ETHIOPIA AND NOW CHAD MAKES MATTER URGENT BEFORE SUDAN IS
SURROUNDED. HE SAID NUBARAK WOULD TELL NUMEIRI THAT IF SUDAN
DOES NOT WANT TO MOVE INTO CHAD, EGYPT WILL. (LATTER IN
CONVERSATION PRES SADAT MADE PLEA TO SEN FOR SMALL ARMS AND
OTHER MILITARY SUPPLIES TO ENABLE HIM TO PLAY POSITIVE ROLE
IN AFRICA; E.G., IN CHAD)

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11. RETURNING TO QUESTION OF ME PEACE AND WEST BANK, SEN OBSERVED THAT IS PRESENTS A DIFFERENT PROBLEM FROM THOSE OF GOLAN OR SINAI AND WILL HAVE TO BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY. WEST BANK MEANS SECURITY, EVEN THOUGH ARABS HAVE MISSLES THAT CAN STRIKE ANYISRAELI CITY. IT MAKES A QUANTUM DIFFERENCE TO ISRAELIS IF THEY COULD BE OVERRUN IN A FEW HOURS, REFERRING TO POSSIBILITY OF WEST BANK PALESTINIAN STATE NARROWING ISRAEL TO 12 MILES AT LATRUN SALIENT. THIS IS WHY WEST BANK IS TO IMPORTANT. JORDAN-LINKED PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD HELP ALLEVIATE THESE FEARS. IN ADDITION, INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE WOULD BE WEAK AND WOULD BE ATTRACTION TO COMMUNISM, WHICH ISRAEL ALSO FEARS. REFERRING TO SADAT'S DESCRIPTION OF US ROLE WHICH HELPED MOVE ALONG FIRST SINAI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT, JAVITS SAID THAT SITUATION TODAY IS MUCH DIFFERENT. ARMIES ARE NOT FACTNG EACH OTHER DIRECTLY. IN ANY CASE, OFFERING IDEAS FOR CONSIDERATION TO PARTIES IS DIFFERENT FROM US PRESIDENT OFFERING IDEAS WITHOUT CONSULTING EITHER PARTY.

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12. SEN JAVITS ASKED ABOUT ASSAD'S POSITION WITH REGARD TO PEACE SETTLEMENT AS WELL AS THAT OF OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. SADAT REPLIED THAT ONLY TWO ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD NOT SUPPORT A PEACE SETTLEMENT; THEY ARE LIBYA AND SOUTH YEMEN. EVEN IRAQ'S LEADERS, SADAT REVEALED, HAD TOLD HIM SECRETARLY THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT WHATEVER CONFRONTATION STATES WANT, BUT THEY COULD NOT GO BACK ON THEIR PREVIOUS PUBLIC STANCE. SYRIA WILL FOLLOW, BUT THEY ARE WAITING FOR EGYPT TO TAKE LEAD. SYRIA HAS AGREED TO DEMILITARIZE GOLAN AND TO HAVE UN OBSERVERS ON HEIGHTS. SADAT SAID PALESTINIANS WILL ALSO AGREE, NOTING THEY HAVE BECOME AFTER LEBANON. IN ANY CASE, ONLY EGYPT CAN BRING PALESTINAINS ALONG IN FINAL ANALYSIS,

WHICH IS WHY SADAT SAID HE EMPHASIZED IF ISRAELIS REALLY WANT PEACE, THEN IT IS POSSIBLE NOW. SEN CAUTIONED SADAT NOT TO OVERESTIMATE THE DEGREE TO WHICH CARTER CAN INFLUENCE ISRAEL. SADAT SAID EVERYONE MUST HELP. THERE IS NOW UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY. HE POINTED OUT ALL FORMER ARAB ADVERSARIES ARE NOW US FRIENDS. HE, SADAT, IS READY TO ACCEPT ANYTHING US ASKED (PROPORTIONAL DEMILITARIZED ZONES, EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS, UN SUPERVISORS), EXCEPT CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ISRAELI SOLDIERS ON EGYPTIAN LAND.

13. CONVERSATION ENDED WITH SEN REFINING HIS THINKING ON PRELIMINARY MEETING CONCEPT (SEE PARA 4). HE SAID HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO PRES CARTER AND SEC VANCE THAT LATTER CONFIDENTIAL

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BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE IDEA OF STABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUP, TO INCLUDE FOREIGN REPS, WHEN HE COMES TO AREA AFTER BEGIN VISIT. HE THEN RESURACED IDEA OF PRELIMINARY MEETING IN WASHINGTON BEFORE GENEVA, BUT SADAT REJECTED IT AGAIN, SAYING ADMINISTRATIVE MEETING JUST BEFORE GENEVA WOULD BE POSSIBLE, BUT NO SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS WOULD BE DISCUSSED.

14. SEN ALSO REPEATED SUGGESTION HE MADE PREVIOUS DAY TO ECONOMIC MINISTERS ABOUT NEED FOR ECONOMIC PLAN; I.E., EGYPT'S VISION OF ITSELF. PRES REASSURED HIM THAT PLAN IS BEING WORKED ON NOW. MOST ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES WILL BE SOLVED BY 1980, SADAT PROJECTED, WHEN WE WILL BE PRODUCING 1 MILLION BARRELS OF OIL PER DAY (SIC). IN ADDITION SUEZ CANAL IS BEING WIDENED AND DEEPENED; JAPENSE HAVE COMPLETED THIRTY PERCENT OF WORK. THIS WILL MEAN THAT TRAFFIC VOLUME OF CANAL WILL TRIPLE BY 1980. PRES DESCRIBED HIS DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES IN NEXT THREE YEARS AS FOOD PRODUCTION AND HOUSING, AND HE MENTIONED INTEREST IN ATTRACTING LATEST AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY.

15. THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT RPT NOT CLEARED WITH CODEL PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM CAIRO. REQUEST DEPT PASS MESSAGE TO CODEL FOR ADDITIONS/CORRECTIONS BEFORE DISTRIBUTION IS MADE. EILTS

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